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Panel II: The Conflict Between
Commercial Speech and Legislation
Governing the Commercialization of
Private Sector Data
Moderator:
Panelists:

Professor Joel Reidenberg*
Jennifer Barrett**
Evan Hendricks***
Solveig Singleton****
David Sobel*****

PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: I am Joel Reidenberg and am
delighted to moderate our second panel this afternoon.
Many interesting ideas were raised by our keynote speakers and
by the previous panel that I hope we will have a chance to discuss
and argue.
Our topic for this panel is the conflict between commercial
speech and legislation governing the commercialization of data
held by the private sector. I would like to spend a few minutes
setting the stage for each of our panelists and raise three
provocative comments on self-regulation, legislation, and First
Amendment commercial speech.
First, we heard earlier this afternoon from Attorney General
Spitzer and Peter Swire, who are each doing excellent work in their
public service. They each explained the case for a market
approach and explained why in New York and in the Federal
Government the emphasis has been on the market approach. I
believe, on the other hand, that the self-regulation approach is a
*
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myopic vision for effective privacy protection in the United
States.1 As we have heard, the increasing use of technology in data
gathering undermines our expectations of protection for privacy.
Indeed, I think we see that privacy is different. Privacy is a
political issue.2 It is a political right,3 what Paul Schwartz has
called a “constitutive right.”4 Privacy is something that is different
from those things we generally associate with marketplace sales.
In that context, I would certainly argue that legislation setting forth
fair information practice standards is a necessity.5
Well, that brings us front and center to the question of today’s
panel, which is: “If we have legislation providing substantive
standards for privacy, what does that mean for commercial speech
rights?”
My second provocative comment is that the issue is not about
speech at all and the First Amendment simply should not apply in
this area. We see in two recent Supreme Court cases, Los Angeles
Police Department v. United Reporting6 and Reno v. Condon,7 an
articulation that the sale of personal information is not being
treated as speech. In Condon, the court described the personal
information and drivers’ records as a “thing in commerce,” while
1

See Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic Commerce,
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 771 (1999) (“[T]he theory of self-regulation has normative
flaws and . . . public experience shows the failure of industry to implement fair
information practices. Together the flawed theory and data scandals demonstrate the
sophistry of U.S. policy.”).
2
See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in
the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 497 (1995) (“The Information
Superhighway . . . and the emerging Global Information Infrastructure place standards for
the treatment of personal information at the forefront of policy discussions among . . .
governments . . . .”).
3
See Reidenberg, supra note 1, at 787 (“In a democratic state, privacy is and
remains a basic right of citizens.”) (citations omitted).
4
See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609, 1664 (1999) (“[R]ather than establishing individual privacy-control, constitutive
privacy seeks to create boundaries about personal information to help the individual and
define terms of life within the community.” (citing Robert C. Post, The Social
Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV.
957, 985 (1989))).
5
See Reidenberg, supra note 1, at 771 (recommending “a framework privacy law in
the United States modeled on the O.E.C.D guidelines that includes a safe harbor
provision for policies and technologies and that creates a U.S. Information Privacy
Commission to assure the balance between citizens’ privacy, industry needs, and global
competitiveness”).
6
Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
7
Reno v. Condon, 120 S.Ct. 666 (2000).
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the court allowed a clear delineation of the purpose for disclosure
of arrest records in United Reporting. I would argue that the sale
of personal information in these contexts is actually quite different
from any of the familiar commercial speech cases, because in each
of the classic commercial speech cases, the Supreme Court ruled
on restrictions affecting the solicitation itself, that is the
advertisement.8 That is not what we are talking about in the
marketing and trafficking of personal information.
My third provocative point that I will leave for the panelists is,
even if you disagree with me on the argument that the sale of
personal information is not within the commercial speech doctrine,
and I suspect most people will, then the Central Hudson test can
readily be satisfied.9 There is clearly a strong case that privacy
legislation in the United States is a compelling state interest, and
such legislation can easily be tailored to satisfy the Central Hudson
balancing.10
So those are my three provocative comments.
Our panelists today, I think in the context of their comments,
will be touching on different issues related to these points.
We will start with Jennifer Barrett, who is the Company Leader
for Information Practices and Government Affairs at Acxiom.
Acxiom is probably one of the largest sellers of personal
information in the United States. They provide substantial
marketing database management services and data warehouse
services, for many companies in the United States.11

8

See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (challenging
state statute prohibiting advertising of liquor prices); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515
U.S. 618 (1995) (challenging Florida Bar rules which prohibit lawyers from sending
targeted direct mail to solicit personal injury or wrongful death clients within thirty days
of accident); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980) (challenging regulation which banned promotional advertising by
electric utility).
9
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The Court’s four-part test used to judge
government restrictions of commercial speech is: 1) Whether the expression is lawful and
non-misleading; 2) Whether the government has a substantial state interest in regulating
the speech; 3) Whether the regulation directly and materially advances that interest; and
4) Whether the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Id.
10
See id.
11
See Acxiom Corporation Overview, at http://www.acxiom.com/about/aboutabout.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2000).
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Then we will hear from Evan Hendricks, who is the Editor and
Publisher of Privacy Times12 and a very well-known privacy
advocate in the United States.
Following Evan, we will hear from Solveig Singleton, who is the
Director of Information Studies at the Cato Institute,13 a think tank
based here in New York that, unless I am wrong, has a very
libertarian bent in its philosophy and the studies they do.
And then, finally, we will hear from David Sobel, who is the
General Counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center,
known as EPIC.14 EPIC has been at the forefront of privacy
litigation and the privacy policy debate in Washington.
With that, I will turn the podium over to Jennifer.
MS. BARRETT: Thank you. It is a pleasure to be here.
I should probably frame these remarks that I am about to make
by saying that I may be the only one in the audience who is not a
lawyer, although I do have a legal team back at the office that
keeps me on the straight and narrow. But what I do have, and what
I think I can bring to the discussion today, is twenty-five years of
practical experience in the industry working with not only a
company that provides personal information, but also many, many
customers who manage personal information of their own.
With regards to the question that was posed today: “Whether
greater legislation governing the commercialization of data is
needed; and, if so, in what form, and so on?” I would like to begin
by saying that I think there are four simple points that need to be
made and studied before you can answer the question.
The first point is, what laws are already in place, and which of
those seem to be most effective?
Number two, what industry self-regulation exists and appears to
be working?
Number three, what benefits does the consumer enjoy from the
free flow of information?
12

See About Us, at http://www.privacytimes.com/index_about.htm (last visited Nov.
1, 2000).
13
See About the Cato Institute, at http://www.cato.org/about/about.html (last visited
Nov. 1, 2000).
14
See About EPIC, at http://www.epic.org/#about (last visited Nov. 1, 2000).
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And fourth, what, and how frequent are the abuses, damages,
injuries, or consequences from that free flow?
Now, as we have discussed today in numerous examples, we
have a wide variety of federal and a growing number of state laws
governing these areas: the Fair Credit Reporting Act,15 the Online
Children’s Privacy Protection Act,16 the Deceptive Mail
Enforcement Act,17 the Financial Services Modernization Act,18
telemarketing sales rules - the list goes on and on and on. At the
state level, I think we are up to ten states now, or maybe twelve as
of this writing, that have “do not call” solicitation laws on the
books.19 We also have a variety of other state legislative issues
dealing with specific kinds of industry data.
Now, as we all know, the law does not prevent the misuse or
abuse of data from occurring. However, I urge anyone who is
considering legislation, to review current laws and again look at
what is working and what is not, because this provides valuable
insight into the practical implementation of what we hope would
become legal, or from a constitutional standpoint, permissible.
For example, let’s take a look at what appears to be a rather
simple problem to solve, and that is the desire of consumers to not
receive unsolicited telemarketing calls during the dinner hour.
Now, we have the Telemarketing Sales Rule that governs
telemarketing at the federal level,20 we have dozens of states that
have “do not call” lists,21 and yet we are still getting, myself
included, telemarketing calls.
The Federal Trade Commission has said, “we have a problem,”
so they have formed a task force to study whether the law in its
current form is effective or not.22 I think what you will find when
their study is complete is that there are two fundamental
15

15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6505 (1999).
17
Deceptive Mail Prevention and Enforcement Act, 39 U.S.C. §§ 3016-17 (1994).
18
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
19
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1278 (West 1999), NEB. REV. STAT. § 861212(2) (1999), 2000 ME. LEGIS. SERV. Ch. 694 (West), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-61-3.5(a)
(1999), HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481P-4(11) (Michie 1999).
20
16 C.F.R. § 310 (1999).
21
See supra, note 19.
22
See FTC Seeking Public Comments on Telemarketing Sales Rule, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/02/tsr.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2000).
16
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components to the law as it is written which make it ineffective.
These components may make the law constitutional, but
ineffective, and therefore the law does not solve the problem it was
intended to address.
First, most consumers are not aware of the Telemarketing Sales
Rule;23 therefore, they do not even know to invoke it. Second,
there are a number of exclusions24 and, unfortunately, a lot of the
excluded categories are those that are the most abused.
This is another example, as we heard from our keynote speakers,
where we have an issue of states’ rights versus federal rights. I
think it is going to be an issue that will continue to arise as we
move forward with this discussion, and with possible legislation.
From an industry standpoint, we would certainly prefer to have a
national “do not call” list rather than fifty different states with fifty
different sets of slightly different rules. I think you would find that
the industry would be rather receptive to that, even though it may
not practically be something that we can hope for.
Now, in addition to reviewing the current laws and
understanding what is working and what is not, it is also important
to look at self-regulation. We have talked quite a bit about that
today. There are a rapidly growing number of initiatives dealing
with a variety of ethical business practices. There are a number of
coalitions that are being formed, where there is not an industry
association in place, to take on this specific issue, as was discussed
with the network advertisers.25
Now, I do not know that I want to go back and dissect the
history of self-regulation. I think it is much like the history of the
Internet, and is somewhat immaterial at this point in time. What
we need to do is look at what is happening now and how we are
going forward.
Steve Emmert brought up the Individual Reference Services
Group (“IRSG”), which is a coalition that was formed in 1997 to
deal with personal information that was used for look-up
identification-and-verification services.26 It has been a very
23
24
25
26

16 C.F.R. § 310 (1999).
See 16 C.F.R. § 310.6 (1999).
See infra notes 26 – 30 and accompanying text.
Individual Reference Service Group (“IRSG”) is a coalition of fourteen leading

PANEL 2.FINAL

12/28/00 7:07 PM

2000] SYMPOSIUM - DATA PRIVACY & THE FIRST AMENDMENT

65

effective group and has had very, very positive results.
The Direct Marketing Association (“DMA”) has instituted its
Privacy Promise and made it a condition of membership as of last
year,27 and has actually kicked a few members out for violating the
guidelines that promote the concepts of notice and choice.28
The Online Privacy Alliance was a group of large companies
involved in specific online activities that came together two short
years ago to try and set some standards.29 The group was a driving
influence behind the statistics that Peter Swire shared with you,
driving privacy policies from the fifteen or sixteen percent level in
1997 to the over-sixty-five percent level last year.30
I think, as we have talked about the network advertisers, it
remains to be seen what the policy will be, but they have certainly
responded quickly and with a great deal of commitment to develop
some industry self-regulation.
A central theme throughout all of this, which has been brought
up in the framing comments from Bob in our previous panel,31 is
that there are fundamental concepts of notice, choice, security, and
data accuracy, that continue to be very consistent and prevalent. I
think if you look at these principles and these concepts, you will
information industry companies who have pledged to adopt self-regulatory principles
governing the dissemination and use of personal data. See Individual Reference Services
Group, available at http://www.irsg.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2000); see also Individual
Reference Services Group, White Paper (outlining the benefits of individual reference
services), available at http://www.irsg.org/html/white_paper.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2000) [hereinafter IRSG White Paper].
27
The Privacy Promise is a public assurance that all members of the DMA will
follow certain specific practices to protect consumer privacy. See Privacy Promise
Member
Compliance
Guide,
available
at
http://www.thedma.org/library/privacy/privacypromise.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2000).
28
See DMA, Privacy Promise Member Compliance Guide, Step 2 (stating that a
DMA member that does not follow the Promise may be subject to “censure, suspension,
or expulsion from the DMA, and publicity to that effect”), available at http://www.thedma.org/library/privacy/privacypromise2.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2000).
29
See ONLINE PRIVACY ALLIANCE, Guidelines for Online Privacy Policies, available
at http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/ppguidelines.shtml (last visited Nov. 1,
2000). These guidelines include the adoption and implementation of a privacy policy,
notice and disclosure, choice and consent, data security, and data quality and access. Id.
30
See Online Privacy Alliance Says Web Sweeps Confirm Significant Progress in
Privacy Self-Regulation, at http://www.privacy alliance.org/news/05121999.shtml (May
12, 1999); Online Privacy Alliance Encourages Businesses to Post Privacy Policies,
(reporting on OPA’s efforts to increase the number of e-commerce companies posting
privacy policies), at http://www.privacyalliance.org/news/02021999.shtml (Feb. 2, 1999).
31
See infra pp. 20-28.
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see them played out, maybe in slightly different forms, within
industry guidelines, but the consistency of the principles is there.
So, I think it is fair to say that yes, there is a conflict between
privacy and commercial free speech, and it is having a major
impact on industry. It is focusing the attention where the attention
needs to be focused, and, from our perspective, it appears to be
working very well.
Now let us move on to discuss the concept of consumer benefit.
We tend to focus most of our energies on the damage done to the
consumer, not on the benefits they enjoy from the
commercialization of data.32 This is an area that is probably the
least well-documented, and certainly the least publicized, of all of
the issues surrounding the commercialization of data. I can
generally place these benefits in the following categories: lower
prices through accurate customer information; more effective
marketing; a better understanding of customer needs and wants;
reduced debt through better screening of potentially bad or highrisk customers; and more effective collection efforts.33
Another benefit is that commercial data collection allows
producers to offer products and services to those who would either
not have the opportunity to receive them or to those to whom
products and services would not be easily available.34 This
includes the handicapped and the elderly especially.35 Next, It
saves consumers time and money.36 Without information to verify
some of the activities that go on, the processes that we have taken
for granted do not occur as speedily as they would, and time is
money to the consumer. Furthermore, Law enforcement is greatly
assisted in locating fugitives, missing children, witnesses and
collecting delinquent child support by the commercialization of
32
See F.T.C., Staff Rep., Public Workshop on Consumer Privacy on the Global
Information Infrastructure, available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy/privacy1.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2000).
33
See ACXIOM White Paper, Beyond Consumer Privacy to Consumer Advocacy,
available at http://www.acxiom.com/whitepapers/wp-16.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2000)
[hereinafter Acxiom White Paper].
34
See Solveig Singleton, Privacy as Censorship: A Skeptical View of Proposals to
Regulate Privacy in the Private Sector, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS No. 295, Jan. 22, 1998
(arguing that poorly targeted direct mail “lead[s] to fewer, more expensive options for
those who shop at home”).
35
See id.
36
See id.
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data.37 Finally, the very information that some say creates
fraudulent situations is the same information that we use to verify
and to prevent, or at least reduce, the occurrence of fraud.38
Now, it should be mentioned that the collection and storage of
personal information about consumers is a means that businesses
use to improve the relationship they have with these very
consumers.39 If they are doing things with the data that the
consumer does not understand or the consumer does not like, then
they do not have a very happy customer.40 So as we have
discussed in most of the speeches, the motivation to listen to the
consumer’s desires and to stop a practice that consumers are
uncomfortable with, is very strong.
Finally, before we answer the question of whether more
legislation is needed, I want to ask and talk about the issue of
damages, injuries, or any other consequences that the consumers
might experience from the free flow of information.
It is always frustrating to a responsible information company,
such as ours, to read the sensationalist coverage in the press, which
is very one-sided, about the potential damages or the potential
harm that can come from the free flow of information, and which
never goes on to discuss or to mention the benefits that the
consumer receives from this free-flow.
The reality of the situation is that it costs a lot of money to store
data. It costs a lot of money to keep it current, and if you do not
keep it current, it has no long-term value. Businesses are not
interested in collecting information or paying for information from
companies, such as ours, that they do not have the opportunity to
turn into some benefit, either in the relationship with these
customers or in driving their own costs down. Now, technological
advances have reduced the cost of the collection and storage of
data, but it is still very real and not an insignificant portion of
anyone’s information technology (“IT”) budget. Acxiom and our
37
See IRSG White Paper, available at http://www.irsg.org/html/whitepaper.htm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2000).
38
See id.
39
See Acxiom White Paper, supra note 33.
40
See id. (“By addressing the shopper’s privacy concerns immediately and
completely – and letting her know that she has the right to correct or delete any erroneous
data – the company is able to convert a potentially negative situation into a positive one
and solidify its relationship with the consumer.”).
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customers do extensive cost/benefit analysis to determine whether
or not the need to capture end-use data is really there before we
embark on such activities. It is never done in a haphazard or
whimsical manner.
Finally, every study that I have seen in the last six months says
that consumers, in addition to wanting their privacy, also want
personalization;41 they want to be treated not as a mass market, but
as an individual.42 The challenge is, how do we do both?
So what does this all mean to the question: “Is more legislation
needed?” We cannot deny that personal information about
individuals is out in the marketplace, but if you look at how our
economy is performing in the new age and the increasing
dependency on the availability of information, one could argue that
the benefits are tremendous, particularly when you compare these
benefits to other countries where the uses of information are much
more restricted.
Now, I would like to talk about the real harm. Are consumers
being flooded with unwanted, offensive e-mail, or is it an
occasional issue, and driven more so by the fact that they visit a
chat room, and by the fact that some piece of information was
transferred about them? Are consumers having their identities
stolen by tracking what they do on Web sites? Are consumers
being stalked, any more than they were before, by information that
is available out on the Net?
I think you will find the answer to those questions is that we do
not have documented proof that this is what is driving, if there is
an increase, some of those activities. And if the documentation
41
See PRIVACY & AMERICAN BUSINESS, Personalization Marketing and Privacy on
the Net: What Consumers Want (revealing that a majority of Internet users want
information that is tailored to their needs and are willing to provide information about
their
preferences
in
exchange
for
personalization),
available
at
http://www.pandab.org/doubleclicktoc.html (Nov. 1999). Sponsorship for the survey was
provided by DoubleClick, Inc. See id., Executive Summary. See also IBM GLOBAL
SERVICES, IBM Multi-National Consumer Privacy Survey (finding that in order to
successfully conduct business on the Internet, companies must provide personalized
service and take proactive steps to ensure privacy), available at
http://www.ibm.com/services/files/privacy_survey_oct991.pdf (Oct. 1999).
42
See IBM GLOBAL SERVICES, IBM Multi-National Consumer Privacy Survey
(finding that companies must provide personalized service and take proactive steps to
ensure privacy in order to successfully conduct business on the Internet), available at
http://www.ibm.com/services/files/privacy_survey_oct991.pdf (Oct. 1999).
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exists, I think you will find that the industry, regardless of what
segment of it you are in, will respond positively and say, “yes, if
the abuses are there, let’s do something about it.” I think the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act was a very good example
of where regulators, legislators, and the industry came together to
work out a piece of legislation.43
However, if the need, as it is sometimes called, is to protect
where there is no real evidence of abuse, only the possibility of
abuse, then I would submit that it is prudent for us to wait a little
longer. Give businesses a little time to decide what information is
important to them, give consumers the time to vote with their
pocketbooks by going to the companies who use the practices they
trust, and give technology the time to put more choices and
controls in the hands of consumers. Give us choices to block those
“cookies” if we so choose, to filter out unwanted e-mail if that is
what offends us, or to surf the Net anonymously if we really want
to take it to that extent. Give consumers the chance to realize the
unrealized benefits that this free flow of information will surely
bring.
Finally, I would like to just make a comment, because everyone
else has, on this issue of “opt-in” versus “opt-out,” because it is
certainly one that is very heated today.
The historical figures, and they are holding fairly consistent,
show us that between five and fifteen percent of the population
“opts-out” when given the chance, and between five and fifteen
percent of the population “opts-in” when given the chance.44 Now,
what does that tell us about the other seventy to ninety percent?
They either do not care, they do not understand, or they do not
have the time to deal with the question.
I suggest that, in the absence of hard factual examples of abuse,
we should not take away the benefits that seventy to ninety percent
are enjoying, and it should not be done under the guise of
protecting the consumer from themselves. However, in the
specific instances where highly sensitive information, as has been
talked about earlier - medical, financial, and so forth - do exist and
known abuses are occurring, then “opt-in” should be considered,
and is being considered. This was one of the practices that the
43
44

15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-05 (1999).
On file with author.
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DMA put in place before the government even came out with
regulations in the area of medical records.
In conclusion, I would just like to say, to answer the question
that was posed to us as panelists, I do not think that we need more
legislation now, except in very carefully selected areas where
inappropriate use of information can be clearly documented and is
repetitive.
What we do need is for all involved - businesses, legislators,
regulators, and the consumers - to keep a close focus on the
privacy principles that the industries have adopted thus far - notice
and disclosure, choice, security, access, and quality - and use them
to help continue to refine the business practices that we see work
and to identify and change those that we see do not work.
In addition, we should be more aggressive in educating the
consumers and making sure they understand the choices that exist
for them. I believe a strong commitment to these principles will
ensure that the consumer enjoys the maximum degree of safety and
protection, while also providing the maximum benefit possible
from a healthy information-based economy.
Thank you.
MR. HENDRICKS: Thank you, Joel. Thanks for the invitation.
A quick salute to the excellent work that the Fordham Intellectual
Property Journal has put into this. It is a top quality program,
having Joel Reidenberg, Paul Schwartz, and Peter Swire, truly the
leading professors in North America on this issue, and
internationally respected. And I think I have told you before, Joel,
that when I grow up, I want to be a professor too.
A few months ago, I actually wrote to Acxiom. I do not know if
you are in charge of the system, but it worked very well. I
immediately got the brochure back. It was very clear and very
easy. I have not bothered to “opt-out” yet, but it was nice to see
that your system worked. So I wanted to say something nice.
MS. BARRETT: Thank you.
MR. HENDRICKS: I was more interested in the article in the
Washington Post recently, which discussed a system which I
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believe Acxiom is associated with.45 Anytime you call an 800
number you cannot use blocking technology like you can with a
local phone number, where you can use *67 or you have your line
blocked. The 800 numbers are part of ANI46, which is considered
a different brain of the beast, so your blocking does not work there,
and automatic number identification will capture your number.
This system, if I remember correctly, which Acxiom is a part of,
has captured and stored some 20 million unlisted phone numbers in
the Acxiom database.
A Washington Post reporter, Robert O’Harrow, quoted Acxiom
as stating its belief that if you called an 800 number of a
commercial enterprise that was part of their network, you were
basically “opting-in” and agreeing to have your unlisted phone
number go into Acxiom’s database, where it could later be
resold.47 I do not agree with that point of view, but it is an issue
we might be able to discuss later.
I am interested in history. You heard about LEXIS-NEXIS48
and you heard about the IRSG Principles.49 So much of what
industry is doing is to avoid legal rights for individuals – they are
advocating against legislation and instead for voluntary “opt-outs.”
What happened with LEXIS-NEXIS is that, all of a sudden, there
was almost a disinformation campaign on the Internet, where some
people were lighting up the Internet with another version of “hack
attacks.”50 Back in 1997, I think, they were saying: “LEXIS is
selling your social security numbers all over the place; they have
got this data on you; it is the P-track system.” Some of what they
were saying about LEXIS-NEXIS was not accurate. I think some
40,000 people “opted out,” or contacted LEXIS-NEXIS with email saying, “get me out of your system,” and congressmen were
actually starting to get mail from constituents. That is what
45
Robert O’Harrow Jr., A Hidden Toll On Free Calls: Lost Privacy; Not Even
Unlisted Numbers Protected From Marketers, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1999, at A1.
46
Automatic Number Identification. Automatic Number Identification is a function
by which the directory number of a calling unit is automatically obtained. This function
allows businesses to compile and store lists of consumers’ telephone numbers.
47
See O’Harrow, supra note 45.
48
See infra p. 41.
49
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
50
See Jerry Berman & Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy in the Digital Age: Work in
Progress, 23 NOVA L. REV. 551, 564 (1999); Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of
Privacy Protection in the European Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173,
221 n.312 (1999).
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brought together the IRSG Group, so they could create a voluntary
program approved by the FTC and thereby avoid legislation.
LEXIS-NEXIS was very upset about this situation because they
were being inaccurately portrayed by bad information going
through electronic information systems. I agree that is wrong, but
at least LEXIS-NEXIS now knows how consumers feel, because
that is what is happening with a lot of the information systems that
have information on consumers.
The issue today is First Amendment and privacy.
Let me tell you a little bit about myself. My name is Evan
Hendricks. I write The Privacy Times. It is a newsletter. We have
a Web site at privacytimes.com. In January we started our
twentieth year. So I am sort of the “lonely pamphleteer” trumpeted
by the Supreme Court.51 Because of the First Amendment, I exist,
and so, I am an ardent First Amendment advocate.
Part of my newsletter covers the Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”).52 In 1982, when the Reagan Administration wanted to
gut the Freedom of Information Act,53 I was on the front lines with
many of the public interest groups documenting what the public
had learned through the Freedom of Information Act. So I also am
very much an open government advocate.
And so, as a beneficiary of the First Amendment, as someone
who has followed these debates, I feel I can say with a certain
amount of authority and certainty that most of the arguments about
the First Amendment clashing with privacy, or that because of the
First Amendment we cannot pass laws to protect the privacy of
personal data, are bogus. So, Joel, your opening remarks to me
were not very controversial; they were common sense.
So I draw the line that there is no First Amendment right to
traffic in your personal data. As Deirdre said, you have a personal
right to say something to somebody; you have a personal right to
mail something to somebody; to publish something and pass it out
51

See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) (stating that “liberty of the
press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just
as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition
methods”).
52
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
53
See Andy Blum, FOIA’s Use Gets Harder Over Time, NAT’L L.J., July 20, 1992, at
36.
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in the street; you have the First Amendment right to communicate
in any way that you want.54
For instance, there was a case where a woman needed to call one
of her colleagues at home, and she calls, and this voice quietly
answers the phone, much like our discussions this afternoon. The
woman says, “Hello, is your mother there?” The child’s voice
says, “Yes, but she is very busy right now.” Then she said, “Well,
is your father there?” “Yes, he is very busy too.” Then she said,
“Is there any other adult I can speak to in the house.” “The police
are here but they are very busy too.” Finally she said, “Look, your
Mom and your Dad are busy, the police are there, they are all too
busy to come to the phone. What are they doing?” “They are
looking for me.”
I feel that these are the sort of structures or systems that we are
building now between Internet commerce and the government to
put consumers under surveillance so that they can know you better
and serve you better or to administer their government programs
better. But the reaction of individuals is very much like the child
hiding in the closet. Already, we are seeing individual countermeasures, people giving false data. And so, as I said, to protect
your privacy in a situation where you do not have legal rights, you
almost have to act like an undercover operative.
Now, we already have privacy law. We have the Video Rental
Law.55 You might remember Judge Bork, who was nominated for
the Supreme Court.56 Our City Paper reporter (the City Paper is
the give-away paper in D.C.) was standing at a video counter and
talking with the clerk, and the clerk said, “Hey, Judge Bork, the
guy who is getting all this fire through the nomination, gets his
videos here.” The reporter said, “Well gosh, can you show me
what he has taken out?” The clerk gave him a list of what Judge
Bork had rented, and he wrote an article about how Judge Bork
likes B movies, detective movies, et cetera57—none of the themes
from the Clarence Thomas hearings.

54

See infra p. 33.
Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994).
56
See David Johnston, Reagan Hints at Bork Nomination Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, July
5, 1987, at A14.
57
See Berman & Mulligan, supra note 50, at 578 n.76.
55
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But this story hit close to home in Congress and they moved
quickly to enact the Video Rental Protection Law.58 That law
makes it clear there is no First Amendment problem. The law says
that you cannot look at a record of what videos someone checks
out from Blockbuster and you do not have any First Amendment
right to do so.59 The statute makes it clear you have a right of
privacy in that information,60 you have a right of privacy in cable
TV,61 you have a right of privacy in credit reports.62 We have a list
of laws which give individuals rights to privacy.
But, we also have some major gaps. For example your medical
records or financial records are not adequately protected in law;
similarly your employment records, like your general Internet ecommerce records - like all the most important records that really
count and are becoming central in the Information Age – are not
adequately protected by law.
And so we talk about “opt-in” versus “opt-out.” I am not as
concerned about that issue. I think the issue has to be, what is our
goal? Our goal is to protect privacy based on informed consent.
All law is based on informed consent and so too should privacy
law, especially in the Information Age, and it should be based on a
purpose test.
You’ve heard about Fair Information Practices. Right at the
heart of Fair Information Practices is the principle that information
collected for one purpose cannot be used for another purpose
without your knowledge and consent.63 That test works very well.
Depending on the context, you can never reach 100 percent, but to

58

See id.
18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (1994) states that “[a] video tape service provider who
knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any
consumer of such provider shall be liable to the aggrieved person . . . .” Personally
identifiable information is defined to include “information which identifies a person as
having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape
service provider.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) (1994).
60
Id.
61
See Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994) (providing that “a
cable operator shall not use the cable system to collect personally identifiable information
concerning any subscriber without the prior written or electronic consent of the
subscriber concerned”).
62
See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
63
See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress at 7-11,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf (June 1998).
59
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the extent that you are close to that shows the extent that you are
protecting privacy.
There are societal benefits. Ironically, a societal benefit is the
free flow of information, which is what led the European
Commission in the Community to enact the Data Protection
Directive.64
Let us go back to your privilege between attorney and client.
The confidentiality privilege is not so they can hide in the closet.
The confidentiality privilege is so the client feels free to tell
everything to the attorney, because only when the attorney knows
everything can that attorney make a judgment as to how to proceed
and to serve the client’s interest. So it is the privilege of
confidentiality that allows for the free flow of information, which
allows for the goal of adequate representation of the client. The
same with doctor and patient, and with clergy and parishioner.
You can apply that same model to society, especially in the
Information Age. The knowledge that your information will only
be used for the purposes for which you gave your informed
consent will encourage you to participate in those systems, in the
democracy, in the economy, and if something goes wrong you
have a remedy. That is where we are going to go someday. It is
just a question of how long it takes us to get there. So, there are
societal benefits.
Ultimately, privacy is for individuals, and privacy, I am
convinced, is emerging as the most important human right of the
Information Age.
Now, what is the history of law? The history of law in society
really is a march toward greater rights for individuals. In
feudalism, the lords had all the rights. Then we moved into
industrial capitalism, and that change in the economic system led
to a change which gave people more legal rights. Slavery was a
form of feudalism, and there were people who defended slavery as
necessary and some sort of natural law, but slavery eventually gave
way to its abolition and to creation of more individual rights.
There was a time in this country when only property owners had
64

See Janis L. Gogan, Next Up: European Privacy – Oct. 24 Marks The Beginning
Of Europe’s New Rules On Privacy. Is Your Business Ready?, INFORMATIONWEEK, Sept.
28, 1998, at 177.
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the right to vote, then there was a time when only men had the
right to vote, and then finally they gave women the right to vote.
And then we had the civil rights movement. These have been the
great movements for human rights in North America. Even the
environment, to some extent, gave individual rights to people.
In all those cases, none of those rights came without struggle,
and I think this will be true for privacy as well. This is because in
my historical examples there were entrenched interests that were
trying to defend feudalism, slavery, stop integration in North
America, and prevent the establishment of civil rights, just as now
there are entrenched interests that do not want individual
Americans to have legal rights to privacy.
That is why our discussion of the benefits of commercial free
speech is quite relevant here, because I think commercial free
speech, including campaign contributions, is clearly protected
under the Constitution. This is a political area. There is a lot of
campaign money flowing on this issue, and I promise you it is
having an influence. Politicians have to do an interesting dance.
They can not be “bad” on privacy. Some might want to move
ahead, but if they somehow play their cards wrong, either they will
not get the campaign contributions that they need or their opponent
will get them, and you have got to be able to buy television air
time for commercials. This is a significant factor in the dynamics
of this issue.
It is interesting to me when the commercial sector talks about the
benefit to the individual. What they are saying is that, “we will
decide for you.” If this is to the people’s benefit, then tell them
about it and let them consent to it. But what the commercial sector
is saying is, “we will decide what is to your benefit.” I think that is
an interesting twist on Big Brother, when organizations are
deciding for the individual what is to their benefit.
In the past, I think that kind of attitude - organizations dictating
to individuals what is to their benefit - is a form of arrogance, and I
think history has shown us that the downfall of power is arrogance.
I think that is why we are on very familiar historical ground, which
makes it such an interesting time.
Thank you.
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MS. SINGLETON: If you look out at the field of American
jurisprudence, what you see is a lot of sacred cows lying around in
a field. Some of these cows have a “Constitution” label on them,
and some of them say “Privacy,” and some of them say “Free
Speech,” and so on. Now, most people are wandering around in
the field looking at the details of the cows, examining an eyelash
or picking up a tail or a hoof or something, but every now and
then, one of the cows will get up and give one of the other cows a
good kick, and then all the cows kind of move around and it
actually gets pretty interesting for awhile. I think this is something
that has the potential to happen with the conflict between privacy
and the First Amendment.
I would like to begin by outlining the issue as a general
philosophical matter - from a philosophical standpoint rather than a
litigation standpoint. When you are considering regulation of
private sector exchanges of data about consumers, the issue
becomes should the government stop businesses from
communicating truthful information about real people and real
events as a general matter?
As a general matter, in human life, the default rule is that we are
free to make observations about one another and learn about one
another. There are exceptions to that general rule of freedom of
information we have created in special contexts. Some of those are
medical privacy, attorney-client privilege, and so on. In those
situations, an expectation of privacy has developed over the years
as a result of industry custom, as businesses learn what they need
to do to gain people’s trust, and ultimately those expectations,
formed from the bottom-up, get built into statutes.
Another example of an exception where we have created walls
on information is copyright. Essentially though, copyright applies
to a pretty limited array of information. And there is a
fundamental constitutional principle that you cannot copyright
facts and ideas.65 So in many ways, copyright is a very limited
concept.
Defamation is another example of a sort of property right in

65

See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556
(1985) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 344-345 (1991).
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information, and that is limited by our understanding of the First
Amendment.
Now, a lot of these informational walls, particularly copyright
and defamation, are problematic when it comes to the Internet,
because that is an environment the entire purpose of which is to
lower the cost of transmitting information. One sees a lot of
enforcement problems arising in this context. On the Internet, it
begins to look like the concepts of defamation and copyright start
to erode and change very quickly.
As a general matter, when you are creating property rights in
information, you are doing a very difficult thing, and something
that is traditionally limited to narrow exceptions. The default rule
remains the freedom of information.
Now, if we think about creating property rights in personal
information - essentially, a system under which personal
information is regulated - we are talking about suddenly moving a
lot of facts about people, and analysis of those facts as well, out of
the realm of shared information and into the realm of regulated
information. If we are going to do that, we should be very, very
careful, because it is a much more radical thing than has heretofore
been attempted in delineating property rights in information.
Now, I am going to switch tracks and talk a little bit about two
of the issues that have arisen in the rather sparse case law
concerning the conflict between the commercial speech doctrine
and privacy.
There are two questions that have come up in the very few cases
that have arisen so far. The first is the question of whether
exchanges of data about consumers between businesses is in fact
commercial speech, or whether it is ordinary speech.
Now, in some cases, information that a company collects about
consumers is clearly going to fall within the standard definition of
commercial speech if it is closely tied to something that we would
recognize as advertising or solicitation. In other cases though, if
information is exchanged between two businesses or is being used
within a company, then you suddenly have something that does not
look very much like what has traditionally been recognized as
commercial speech.
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So far, there is very little solid analysis of this question in the
case law. To give you an example, there was one case, the Los
Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting case,66 where a
company was in the business of selling many units of information,
which were essentially sentences in the form of, “X was arrested
on the following date.” The Court asked whether this type of
speech was commercial speech and decided this issue in about a
paragraph.67 It said, to paraphrase, “Well, this has got to be
commercial speech because it is being sold and the sentences are
not very long and do not contain very much information.”68
Now, I think all of you can find reasons why those two criteria
are not very good ways of selecting out commercial speech. What
may have been going on in the Court’s mind was something along
the lines of, “Well, it is a commercial actor; therefore, what they
do must be commercial speech.” But that is not the traditional
commercial speech analysis at all. So, I think that the question of
whether and when the sale of factual information is commercial
speech is an issue that the courts will continue to grapple with.
The second issue that has come up in the case law, is the
question of the strength of the government’s interest in regulating
privacy. Under the commercial speech test, regulation needs to be
a “substantial interest” to pass First Amendment scrutiny.69
Now, if all the legislature had to do, when faced with the
substantial interest test, is recite vague things about privacy and
talk about Roe v. Wade70 and the Fourth Amendment and so on,
given that constitutional privacy is quite a different problem from
privacy issues that arise in marketing, it would basically gut
constitutional protections. So, when we have a stated legislative
66

Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999),
rev’g United Reporting Publ’g Corp. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.
1998), aff’g United Reporting Publ’g Corp. v. Lungren, 946 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.Cal.
1996).
67
See United Reporting Publ’g Corp. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133, 11361137 (9th Cir. 1998).
68
See id. (holding that United Reporting did nothing more than sell arrestee
information to clients, a pure economic transaction which falls within the core notion of
commercial speech).
69
See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980); see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Assn. v. United States, 527 U.S.
173, 178 (1999).
70
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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interest in protecting privacy, we need to look pretty closely at it to
examine it for real substance.
So far, the cases and regulations that have been considered in the
cases have not gotten very far with this analysis. At least one court
has looked at the issue, broken it down, and said: “Okay, when
we’re considering this use of information for marketing, it is not
the same thing as when we consider a police search under the
Fourth Amendment.”71 This court has separated out the different
types of privacy interests at stake.72 This analysis is along the right
lines. That kind of precision in distinguishing constitutional
privacy cases, from cases where there is no state action in
collecting the information, is what courts will continue to look for
in defining the state’s interest in cases addressing a free speech
versus privacy conflict.
Now, as a general rule, companies moving information around to
sell things to consumers, develop products, or start a business, as a
general matter do not harm consumers; although, they may annoy
them. Therefore the government’s interest in regulating privacy is
not very strong.
Because of the key role that information exchange plays in
letting small companies get a foot in the door when competing
against large companies, in starting new business, in developing
new products, and so on; these cases, where you consider the
constitutionality of private-sector regulation, are going to test a
main presumption underlying the commercial speech doctrine
today. That presumption is that “Economic Man” is somehow a
fundamentally different and less important creature than “Artist
Man” or “Journalist Woman.”
Because of the difficulty in showing harm to consumers and of
cabining all data flows as commercial speech, I anticipate private
regulation running into considerable difficulty in the courts on free
speech grounds.
Thank you.

71
72

U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1999).
See id.
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MR. SOBEL: Thank you.
It is always a challenge to be the last speaker following ten
speakers who have done a very good job of covering a lot of
ground. So, I am going to have some trouble breaking new ground
here, but I will do my best. I will also try to respond to some of
the points that have been made in the preceding comments.
Let me say a little bit about my credentials, which are somewhat
similar to the ones that Evan Hendricks told you about. I am also a
long-time defender of the First Amendment. Among other things,
I was co-counsel in Reno v. ACLU,73 the Supreme Court case that
struck down the Communications Decency Act,74 and my
organization has a very strong commitment to protecting free
speech and the First Amendment on the Internet.75 So, I come at
this issue as both a privacy advocate and a free speech advocate.
I am also very much committed to the availability of information
and public access to government information. I have been a
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) litigator for twenty years,
so my impressions of the privacy issue and the balancing that takes
place, has been formed by the FOIA process and by the case law
that has been developed under the Freedom of Information Act.76
Under two of the exemptions to the FOIA, there is in fact a very
well-developed balancing test between the need for public
disclosure of information on the one hand, and the protection of
personal privacy on the other.77 So, I see myself coming to the
issue of the First Amendment versus privacy as someone who has
sensitivities on both sides of that apparent conflict.
Having said that, I, for the last several years, having heard the
First Amendment arguments that have been put forward, am not
convinced. I do not see a serious First Amendment impediment to
the privacy legislation that exists and the privacy legislation that
many of us believe is necessary to address the practices that we are
seeing increasingly on the Internet. I think the Internet is driving a
73

521 U.S. 844 (1997).
The Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) was part of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. III 1997)).
75
See About EPIC, at http://www.epic.org/#about (last visited Nov. 1, 2000).
76
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
77
See Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 - 374 (1976) (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 1497, p. 11 and S. REP. NO. 813, p. 9).
74
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fresh look at this issue, and I believe a reasonable First
Amendment analysis should not interfere with providing
meaningful legal rights and remedies to consumers.
I have listened to the First Amendment arguments and I don’t
see, for instance, why similar arguments could not be made with
respect to the federal wiretap law, which was amended in 1986 to
apply to e-mail and other electronic communications.78 Why, for
instance, is there not a First Amendment problem with the
government saying that I cannot intercept and disseminate your
telephone
private
communications
or
your
e-mail
communications? What if the same information that a Web site
collects about me was contained in a telephone conversation?
Suppose I was calling a friend and I was listing the Web sites that I
like to visit and describing the particular material that I have
accessed on the Internet? Why is there a philosophical difference
between the information being intercepted without my knowledge
in a telephone conversation or an e-mail message and being
compiled by a Web site without my knowledge?
So, I do not see a significant distinction between the wiretap
context, which I think all of us readily acknowledge is an
appropriate governmental regulation of conduct, and similar
controls on the surreptitious collection of information on the Web.
In a moment, I am going to talk a bit about the DoubleClick
situation.79 I think it demonstrates that information is in fact being
collected without the knowledge or consent of most individuals,
much as it might be in an intercepted phone conversation.
What about the FTC Act itself,80 which is currently being put
forward as the existing source of privacy protection that the federal
law provides to consumers? These are the protections that are
frequently pointed to, specifically the FTC’s jurisdiction over
unfair and deceptive trade practices. Why is there not a First
Amendment problem with that? What constitutes an unfair trade
practice? It is not necessarily fraudulent behavior. It does not
necessarily involve anything other than accurate information about
individuals, but just being used and manipulated in ways that the
Commission might determine to be unfair. If that structure is
78
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
79
See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
80
The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994).
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appropriate, and if there is a legitimate governmental role in
regulating unfair and deceptive trade practices, I don’t see why the
First Amendment would prevent us from going a step further and
regulating many of the activities that do not fall within the unfair
and deceptive trade practice regime.
That leads me to a discussion of DoubleClick, which has been
talked about a bit today. I would like to discuss it in a little more
detail because I think it provides an interesting test case for the
adequacy of the current privacy regime we have in the United
States.
As I mentioned, the Federal Trade Commission and the FTC Act
are frequently pointed to as providing the legal framework for
consumer remedies in the privacy realm. My organization last
week filed a complaint with the FTC against DoubleClick alleging
that DoubleClick’s information-collection practices constitute
unfair and deceptive trade practices.81
DoubleClick, as you might know, is the largest online
advertising company.82 Basically the way they operate is that they
place “cookies” on the hard drives of users who visit various Web
sites that serve up banner ads that are provided by DoubleClick.83
Now, an interesting aspect of this is that the user never
consciously deals with DoubleClick. You do not go to the
DoubleClick Web site and thereby have a cookie placed on your
hard drive. Instead, you go to The New York Times Web site, you
go to the CNN Web site, and by virtue of receiving the ad that
DoubleClick is providing at that Web page, you receive a “cookie”
which essentially brands your computer and makes it identifiable
to DoubleClick.
DoubleClick for many years has claimed, to anyone who
managed to actually visit its Web site, that all of this activity was
anonymous, that “cookies” just contained a unique identifier. I
would be, for instance, “User 123;” I would not be identified as
David Sobel, and DoubleClick provided assurances at its Web site
81
Complaint before the Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of DoubleClick,
Inc, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/internet/FTC/DCLK_complaint.pdf (last
visited Nov. 1, 2000).
82
See Bob Tedeschi, In a shift, DoubleClick puts off its plan for wider use of the
personal data of Internet consumers, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 2000, at C5.
83
See id.
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that this information was and would remain completely
anonymous.
Significantly, those statements started to change last year when
DoubleClick announced its plans to acquire a company called
Abacus Direct, which is an offline direct marketing database
company.84 Abacus Direct has a database that contains 88 million
consumer profiles that are largely derived from catalog sales.
Many of us in the privacy community who were looking at the
proposed acquisition expressed a concern that the Abacus
database, the 88 million identifiable profiles, would be married
together with the approximately 100 million anonymous online
profiles that DoubleClick had compiled over the years. And
suddenly, the privacy assurances at the DoubleClick Web site
began to get watered down. There was no longer the use of the
word “anonymous.” The assurance was no longer provided that
this information would be and would remain completely
anonymous.
And then, after the acquisition was actually completed last
November, DoubleClick announced its plans to in fact begin this
process of merging the databases, but with the caveat that this
would be done with notice and, as they put it, “choice” on the part
of the users who were so identified.85
Our complaint to the FTC alleges that this constitutes an unfair
and deceptive trade practice.86 It is unfair because the average
user, as I said, never goes to the DoubleClick Web site. The
average user, I think, even after all of the controversy and all of the
press stories, is probably unaware of the fact that there is a
company called DoubleClick and that that company has placed
markers on the users’ machines. How can it possibly be
characterized as something that is occurring with the knowledge
and consent of users? So, our first claim to the FTC is that this
scheme, because of its invisibility, is fundamentally unfair.
The deception claim has to do with the company’s earlier
assurances that the information would remain anonymous. Now,
84

C4.

85

DoubleClick to Buy Retailing Data Base Keeper, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1999, at

See, e.g., Will Rodger, Online Profiling Firms Plan to Police Themselves, USA
TODAY, Nov. 8, 1999, at A2.
86
See supra note 80 at ¶¶ 28-33.
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as I said, I suspect that not many of the people who have those
“cookies” on their hard drives ever found their way to the
DoubleClick Web site and saw that assurance, but to the extent that
they did, that constitutes a deceptive trade practice.
This is going to provide an important test case, to see whether
the existing remedy that federal law provides, which is the
somewhat difficult standard of unfair and deceptive trade practices,
really works in the privacy context. In preparing the complaint, I
have to say that it really did feel like we were trying to fit a square
peg into a round hole because, frankly, the unfair and deceptive
trade practice analysis does not always work for a privacy case. In
this case, however, I think it does because of the invisibility of the
challenged activity.
I think we will have to see what the Commission does with the
situation. I am not overly optimistic, frankly. I think the
Commission, if they look at this at all, will probably nibble around
the edges of it. I think that this is going to provide some baseline
data for us to clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of the current
legal regime in the privacy realm.
I want to just briefly address the issue of whether or not personal
information is property, and whether the individual who the
information relates to should have some property right in their
personal data.
I will make an observation about the U.S. West case,87 which is
in the symposium materials and which has been discussed today.
It has not been commented on much in any of the analysis or
discussion of the case that I have seen, but if you look at the
decision, you will notice that in the Tenth Circuit, U.S. West made
two claims: First, the company challenged the FCC’s CPNI88 rules
on First Amendment grounds; but the firm also raised a Fifth
Amendment claim, saying that the rules required it to obtain the
permission of consumers was a “taking” of their property.89 In
other words, the CPNI information, the calling records of the
87
U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom.
Competition Policy Inst. v. US West, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2215 (2000).
88
Customer Proprietary Network Information.
89
U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1230 (“[P]etitioner argues that the CPNI regulations raise
serious Fifth Amendment Takings Clause concerns because CPNI represents valuable
property that belongs to the carriers and the regulations greatly diminish its value.”).
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individual customers, was, according to U.S. West, company
property.90
It seems to me, first of all, that the claim is completely
inconsistent with the First Amendment argument, although the
court didn’t need to get to the Fifth Amendment argument or the
property claim because it resolved the case on First Amendment
grounds.91 But I just throw that out because I think if U.S. West
can claim that customer data is their property, we could certainly
envision legislation that would change that presumption and
establish that such information is, in fact, the property of the
individual to whom it relates. I think that would remove a lot of
the First Amendment concerns that have been raised.
Finally, I want to talk a little about “opt-in” and “opt-out”
because that has been a major point of discussion today. I think we
have to assess the burden placed on consumers in a scheme that
requires “opting-out,” particularly on the Internet. I think this is
the environment in which the inadequacy and the inappropriateness
of “opt-out” has really been demonstrated.
What this approach would really require - and I think the
DoubleClick case is an interesting example of this - would be for
every user at every Web page to read these very difficult and
voluminous privacy policies and make copies of them, because
they are subject to change, as the DoubleClick case indicates. So
the average consumer, who would want to raise some claim against
DoubleClick based on a contract theory, for instance, would have
to have thought ahead two years ago to make copies of those
previous privacy policies. So, there is a real burden involved in
saying to consumers, “you have got to read the policy, here is your
right to “opt-out;” but, by the way, the policy might change, so you
really need to check back periodically to make sure that we are still
doing what we said we were going to do six months ago.”
And finally on this point, if, as we have heard, the benefits to
consumers are so real when personal information is used in the
ways that we have been discussing, and targeted advertising is
directed to consumers, then I do not understand why industry is so
resistant to an “opt-in” model. Make the case, explain to people
why it is to their advantage to “opt-in” to an information collection
90
91

Id.
Id.
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system. Industry should do very well in that endeavor if, in fact,
extensive data collection is something that, as they claim, most
consumers want and would find beneficial.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Thank you.
I think what I am going to do is start by opening it up to see if
there are any initial questions.
QUESTION: I have a question, certainly for Solveig and for
anyone else on the panel. In the Telecommunications Act,92 part
of the justification behind the CPNI rules93 was competition. The
concern was that local phone companies had a wealth of calling
pattern information that would be critical to competitive services,
and the new law hoped to encourage market entry for long
distance, local, and wireless usage. Congress did not want
companies to have an unfair advantage based on all the data they
had from what had been a very regulated market.
I think there are some interesting parallels between the CPNI
rules and the Financial Services Modernization Act, known as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLB”).94 GLB sets rules for the use
of information inside financial institutions and for the disclosure of
information outside the institution.
Banks, securities, and
insurance companies that used to be separate entities are now
going to be merging, and so they will have the benefit of a
significant volume of data with few limitations on affiliate sharing,
whereas some of the small actors are going to be quite
disadvantaged entering these new markets.
So, have you looked at the implications of privacy rules for
competition in, as you said, an incredibly information-dependent
age?
MS. SINGLETON: Yes, I think privacy rules have a potentially
enormous impact on competition. I think that is part of the reason
to stay out of the whole business of regulation in that area, because
92
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
93
Id. § 222.
94
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999), Pub. L.
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and
15 U.S.C.).
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if you tailor the regulation narrowly enough to target a particular
industry sector, or a particular problem, then the economy
restructures itself to work around the rules and to get out of the
narrow category that has been regulated.
I would generally say that I think on the whole the role that
information plays in competition is going to be a tremendously
complicated one. There are not a lot of economic studies that have
been done on this subject yet.
But I guess I would generally say that, as a general rule, this is a
reason to stay away from regulation across-the-board rather than a
reason to begin regulation and then expand it to include many
different companies.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: I think there are many problems
with the standard of review of the Tenth Circuit in the U.S. West
case.95 The court might not even get to the privacy issue on
appeal.
If I might add a couple of footnotes to that, in the Tenth Circuit
U.S. West case,96 there has been a petition for rehearing en banc. I
don’t know if that has been. . .
MR. SOBEL: It was denied.97
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: I didn’t realize that. Has it been
appealed to the Supreme Court yet?
MR. SOBEL: No.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Do you know if it will be?
MR. SOBEL: The government is considering it.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Okay.
The other point is, in looking at the Tenth Circuit’s opinion, the
court criticized the FCC very heavily for not conducting a
sufficient inquiry into “opt-in” versus “opt-out.”98 I would
certainly concur with Evan. I am not sure what docket the Tenth
Circuit was reading because, at least as I read the FCC’s docket,
95
96
97
98

U.S. West, 182 F.3d 1224.
Id.
Competition Policy Inst. v. U.S. West, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2215 (2000).
U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1238-39.
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there was quite a discussion of the difference between “opt-in” and
“opt-out” that the Court seemed to willfully ignore. But, we will
see what happens in that case. It is interesting.
The other footnote goes in part to Solveig’s point. The
competition implications of fair information practices are certainly
significant, and I think in some ways you make the case for having
omnibus legislation rather than none at all. If we continue to
pursue a targeted approach, as we have done in the United States, I
think you are absolutely right that what happens is the law
encourages circumvention. For example: “Well, if we regulate it
as a video rental service provider under the ‘Bork Bill,’99 then if I
provide video over the Internet, I am not covered.” So, there is an
incentive to provide service over the Internet.
There are some other interesting cases involving this
competition angle. The credit reporting agencies have been very
upset because many of the large credit issuers, the banks such as
Citigroup, started to refuse to provide transaction information to
the credit reporting bureaus. Credit issuers stopped reporting data
such as “John Smith is paying his debt on time.” The reason was
that the credit bureaus were turning around and selling these names
and addresses to competitors who used this information to make
unsolicited offers of credit or insurance. So, credit grantors like
Citibank felt these were their best customers; they are paying off
their credit debt on time. The credit bureau is going to turn around
and help competitors of Citigroup. The competition would try to
cherry-pick Citigroup’s best customers and offer them a better
interest rate. Citigroup, as a large conglomerate, all of a sudden,
had enough information about tens of millions of Americans that
they no longer needed the same services of a credit bureau to make
decisions about granting credit. So, there are some very significant
competition implications that are playing out there.
QUESTION: I want to address this to Ms. Barrett. It seems to
me that the constitutional issue in this case is going to be decided
by the political consensus that develops in the country. Ultimately,
this is not one of those issues which is going to be held up on some
99

Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710-2711 (1994). The act
was enacted in response to the revelation at the Supreme Court nomination hearings of
Judge Bork that a list of his video tape rentals had been procured and made publicly
available. See Video Privacy: “Nonpublic” People Are Even More Important, WASH.
POST., Mar. 6, 1988, at C8.
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real constitutional doctrine. I have some sense of what privacy
means. I can identify it in terms of the phone calls I get at night
and in terms of brochures that come to me that I do not want. But I
really have absolutely no sense of what your argument is
politically; in other words, how you think you are going to carry
the day, other than in the abstract sense of what the efficiencies are
or the reduced cost that I may experience. What is the value to me,
how you are going to convince me to write a letter to my
congressman saying, “do not protect what I perceive as my
privacy?”
MS. BARRETT: This is one of the issues that the industry is
looking at, because the value to the consumer is not clear public
knowledge, and it is in many cases very poorly documented.
I will give you one very specific example of a situation that
actually deals with a public record, which is not our forum here,
but it is a good one. The property information, the recorded deed
of your house, which has been a public record for many, many
years, is a very integral part of the mortgage industry. It has been
documented that mortgage rates in the United States are
approximately two points less than they are in other countries
because of the free flow of mortgage information.100
Now, I think if the consumer knew some of the real tangible
benefits that can result from the free flow of information, they
might feel differently about it. However, as an industry, we have
not done a very good job of documenting those examples. I think
you are going to begin to see more documentation of these benefits
as time goes forward.
MR. HENDRICKS: I did not address this because this is not a
public records panel, but the purpose test works very well and is
the way to guide the use of driver’s records. Right now and
historically, driver’s records have been available for any purpose,
which is why you get horror stories about stalkers using
Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) records.
I don’t think anecdotes should drive our debate, but I think
systematically you want to look at a purpose test for property
records for property purposes. In half the states, the law is that
100
WALTER F. KITCHENMAN, U.S. CREDIT REPORTING:
OUTWEIGH PRIVACY CONCERNS 4 (Tower Group 1999).
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voting records are only for voting purposes, and not to be used for
commercial purposes. You should let the purpose test drive the
use of public records.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Let me ask for one more
question and then I’ll ask a question before we adjourn for
cocktails.
QUESTION: I just wanted to ask any of you to comment more
about substantive regulation. The discussion today has focused
more on self-regulation as the predominant force in the industry.
From what I understand, the debate over “opt-in” versus “opt-out”
seems to hinge on a debate between the self-regulation versus
substantive regulation; substantive regulation being more of the
“opt-in” and self-regulation being more of the “opt-out.” Can you
comment more on substantive regulation?
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: I think I feel safe in saying the
privacy community favors legislation based on the widely accepted
fair information practice standards.
This is the law in Europe.101 Whether the data is government
held information or privately held information, citizens have legal
rights and citizens have a remedy if personal information is
mistreated. Personal information cannot be used for secondary
purposes, and governments have an oversight office to turn to if
something does go wrong.102
This is the scheme in the
103
Netherlands, for instance.
The Dutch have baseline protections
of law, and then ask the different sectors of the economy to come
forward and submit their own codes of how the sector can
implement the law.104 Then the Dutch Privacy Commissioner and
the various industries go back and forth, finally agreeing on the
code for specific sectors of industry.105
You have to start with the basic underpinning of rights based on
fair information practices, which we already have, to a limited
101

See generally European Union Directive 95/46/EC.
See David Banisar & Simon Davis, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An
International Survey of Data Protection and Surveillance Laws and Developments, 18 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 12-13 (1999).
103
See Personal Data Protection Act of July 6, 2000, available at
http://www.registratiekamer.nl/bis/top_2_6.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2000).
104
Id. at Art. 25(1).
105
Id. at Art. 25(4).
102
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extent, in laws such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act106 or the
Privacy Act which covers federal agencies.107
Simson Garfinkel has a new book out,108 and there is an article
in the current issue of The Nation, where he advocates expanding
the Fair Credit Reporting Act to apply to everything.109 These
standards work well no matter what the medium, and they are
already in place in Europe. These standards represent basic
fairness for individuals and ultimately are good for commerce.
MS. SINGLETON: If I could add to that, I think as a theoretical
model, self-regulation could take the form of “opt-in” or “opt-out,”
as could substantive regulation. The reason that self-regulation has
tended to take the form of “opt-out” is that the companies looking
at how to develop regulation need something that can work with
their existing businesses without having to completely restructure
their entire information systems. They are looking at “opt-out”
because it is something that, from a business standpoint, is a
manageable task.
I might also just comment that even the European law, which is
held up as a very conservative law, does not require “opt-in.”
“Opt-out” is a permissible form of consent under that law. So it
really is not an “opt-in” versus “opt-out” issue when you get to the
substantive issue.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: I want to ask a closing question
that brings us back to a point that Jennifer Barrett started with in
her comments, which is, “what are the abuses?” Among her four
questions, the last one was, “what are the abuses?” I think this
goes to the heart of many of the issues we were talking about
today, because the question of whether self-regulation is
satisfactory, whether legislation is necessary, and whether
legislation could meet the Central Hudson test,110 will hinge on
how we define the harm and what we see as the abuse.
106

Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681(u) (2000).
Federal Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (2000).
108
SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (O’Reilly & Assoc. ed., 2000).
109
See Simson Garfinkel, Privacy and the New Technology: What They Do Know
Can Hurt You, NATION, Feb. 28, 2000, at 11.
110
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980) (setting out a four-part test to judge government restrictions on commercial
speech).
107
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My question is, in part, why are we having such difficulty
finding the harm? Why is not it that information profiling, in and
of itself, is an indignity and a harm that society recognizes? I think
when seen in the light of day, there are many companies out there
selling the same types of detailed profile information; it is just that
they are hidden from public view. And it is the sense that this data
is being profiled and sold secretly that I think is, in part, what your
question reaches.
So, my closing question is, why do we not define that in and of
itself as a harm?
MR. SOBEL: Joel, if I can address that, I agree with that very
much. Our perspective on this is that privacy is a fundamental
right and there should not be any need to catalog specific harms
beyond the violation of a basic right. We do not, for instance, ask:
“What is the harm when somebody is denied their right of free
speech?” I believe that privacy rights are similar and that they are
fundamental human rights and you should not have to put a
monetary value, for instance, on what the loss is or specify what
the harm is.
But that is not to say that we are not heading for a situation
where there are likely to be some very concrete harms in the
future. As these databases continue to grow and become more
sophisticated and more widely available, I do not think it is beyond
the realm of possibility that reference to such databases will
become a typical part of pre-employment screening, for instance,
or used by insurance companies making decisions whether to
insure people.
So, I think we are heading for a situation where there will be
many horror stories, but at that point it might be too late. So, to a
certain extent, the concern today is anticipatory.
MS. SINGLETON: From my standpoint, human beings have a
fundamental right to learn about each other and to communicate
what they have learned to other people.111 There are an awful lot
of things that we could outlaw on the argument that they are not
consistent with human dignity. There are a lot of things that
111

See generally Solveig Singleton, Privacy As Censorship: A Skeptical View of
Proposals to Regulate Privacy in the Privacy Sector, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS No. 295,
Jan. 22, 1998.
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human beings do that are just not that dignified. And yet, I do not
really think that a human being is that fragile a creature and that
human dignity is that weak a thing that the fact that a company has
learned some information about your behavior and has sold it to
another company is really a harmful attack on that.
MS. BARRETT: I would comment that I think harm, once you
get past the obvious legal abuses - identity theft, stalking, and so
forth - becomes a very subjective thing. What I might view as
harmful to me versus what Joel or others on this panel, or those of
you in the room, might view as harmful would probably be very
different. I think that is the difficulty that we face in trying to
answer the question.
MR. HENDRICKS: I think that goes for benefits too; that is also
subjective. But clearly, there is progress on this, in the sense that
harms have been alleged in lawsuits recently filed against
DoubleClick,112 Alexa of Amazon.com,113 any others?
PARTICIPANT: Yahoo!
MR. HENDRICKS: Yes. How could we forget that? That guy
sued Yahoo! because they were standing by their privacy policy
and then turned around and sued them for violating people’s
privacy - Larry Friedman in Dallas.114 So the courts might be
speaking on this sooner than we expect.
However, I think that there is a certain model that we can look at
to understand that there is still plenty of freedom within a system
of informed consent that respects privacy. I mean, take “The Jerry
Springer Show, for instance. Those people spill their guts in front
of a national audience, but they give their informed consent to do it
and they totally understand the consequences of just hanging
themselves out there. That is a system where they are free to be
undignified, but they are clearly exercising their rights to free
speech and there is no invasion of privacy.

112

Judnick v. DoubleClick, Inc., No. CV 000421 (Sup. Ct. Marin County Cal. filed
Jan. 27, 2000).
113
Newby v. Alexa Internet and Amazon.com, No. C 00 0054 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 6,
2000).
114
See, e.g., Susan Borreson, Suit Claims Cyber “Cookies” are Poison, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 15, 2000, at 5; Yahoo! Faces Texas Suit Over Privacy Concerns, NAT’L L.J., Feb.
28, 2000, at B9.
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PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: With that, I would like to
conclude the panel and the afternoon and give a thanks and
congratulations to the IPLJ,115 and especially to Joshua Sussman
who put today’s program together. It has really been a terrific and
productive session, and I hope this is the beginning of a very long,
spirited debate on these issues.
Thank you very much. I hope you will all stay for cocktails.
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